Stakeholder participation in site assessment and management : a real case of Vincennes, France by Hazebrouck, Benoît & Ledrans, Martine
Stakeholder participation in site assessment and
management : a real case of Vincennes, France
Benoˆıt Hazebrouck, Martine Ledrans
To cite this version:
Benoˆıt Hazebrouck, Martine Ledrans. Stakeholder participation in site assessment and manage-
ment : a real case of Vincennes, France. UHLMANN, O. ; ANNOKKEE, G.J. ; ARENDT, F. 9.
International UFZ-Deltares/TNO Conference on management of soil, groundwater & sediments
(CONSOIL 2005), Oct 2005, Bordeaux, France. Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe. Karlsruhe,
pp.48-55, 2005. <ineris-00976168>
HAL Id: ineris-00976168
https://hal-ineris.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ineris-00976168
Submitted on 9 Apr 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Stakeholder Participation In Site Assessment And Management: A Real Case Of Vincennes, France
B. Hazebrouck13, M. Ledrans2a
1INERIS, Parc Technologique ALATA, B.P. 2, 60550 Verneuil-en-Halatte, France
1ae-mail: benoit.hazebrouck@ineris.fr, phone: 33 3 3344556112
2lnVS, 12 rue du Val d'Osne, 94415 Saint-Maurice cedex, France
2ae-mail: m.ledrans@invs.sante.fr, phone: 33 1 41796755
Key words: contaminated soil, pollutant transfer, epidemiology, stakeholders participation, health risk
assessment, perception
1. Summary
Stakeholders1 participation is increasingly considered as a plain part of thé assessment and thé
management of a contaminated site. It is also acknowledged to be a difficult and sometimes risky
challenge. Beside virtual experiments on "test groups", there is very little feedback on real cases of
extensive stakeholders1 participation on contaminated sites in Europe. No guideline or support document
exist in Europe to help to organize Stakeholders' participation.
We présent hère thé real case of a Southern area of thé town of Vincennes near Paris: following a high
number of cancers among children in a school in thé vicinity of a former industrial site and a hospitai
incinerator, thé Health Ministry set up an independent Scientific Committee in charge of designing thé
epidemiological and risk assessment studies, of reviewing theirs results and of issuing recommendations.
The Prefect directed a Participation Committee gathering ail stakeholders in thé aim of sharing ail
information available on thé site, of discussing thé results of thé studies and thé conclusions of thé
Scientific Committee and collecting opinions and expectations of each stakeholder in order to prépare
décisions. Numerous studies were conducted. The Scientific Committee reviewed more than 30 protocols
and reports.
This expérience is discussed hère with regard to major questions on stakeholders1 participation in site
assessment and management, such as thé communication between experts and non-experts and
between experts of différent fields (health scientists vs. environmental engineers), thé impact of thé
média, thé psychological impacts, thé "crisis vs. non-crisis" aspects of participation. The discussion
intégrâtes other expérience gathered on stakeholders1 involvement It leads to thé identification of some
ingrédients for an efficient stakeholders1 participation, event if thé specificity of each case, and thé
importance of spontaneity, reactivity, is recognized.
2. Introduction
Stakeholders1 participation is increasingly considered as a plain part of thé assessment and thé
management of a contaminated site. It is also acknowledged to be a difficult and sometimes risky
challenge. Beside virtual experiments on "test groups" (Petts et al., 2003), there is very little feedback on
real cases of extensive stakeholders' participation on contaminated sites in Europe. No guideline or
support document exist in Europe to help organize Stakeholders1 participation.
We présent hère thé real case of a Southern area of thé town of Vincennes near Paris: following a high
number of cancers among children in a school in thé vicinity of a former industrial site and a hospitai
incinerator, thé Health Ministry set up an independent Scientific Committee in charge of designing thé
epidemiological and risk assessment studies, of reviewing theirs results and of issuing recommendations
conceming management actions. The Prefect directed a Participation Committee gathering ail
stakeholders in thé aim of sharing ail information available on thé site, of discussing thé results of thé
studies and thé conclusions of thé Scientific Committee and collecting opinions and expectations of each
stakeholder in order to prépare décisions. The whole case was conducted in a constant urgency, which is
no exception.
This expérience is discussed hère with regard to major questions on stakeholders1 participation in site
assessment and management, such as thé communication between experts and non-experts and
between experts of différent fields (health scientists vs. environmental engineers), thé impact of thé
média, thé psychological impacts, thé "crisis vs. non-crisis" aspects of participation. The discussion
intégrâtes other expérience gathered on stakeholders' involvement. It leads to thé identification of some
ingrédients for an efficient stakeholders1 participation.
3. Présentation of thé real case of Vincennes
3.1. History and stakeholders
In 1999 and 2001, three cases of cancers among children were reported in thé infant school named
Franklin Roosevelt in thé South of Vincennes. The school had been built between 1987-1990, on a former
industrial site (film materials from 1905 until 1987) and immediately downwind of thé incinerator of thé
Bégin military hospital (1970-1994). In 2000-2001, limited environmental investigations and
epidemiological assessment concerning thé school were conducted. They were reviewed by an ad hoc
"national expert committee". They concluded: "thé information gathered on thé environmental quality and
thé observed cases of cancer does not allow to suspect a link between thé fréquentation of thé infant
school and thé occurrence of thé cancers". Therefore no further investigations were recommended (InVS,
2001).
But thé social préoccupation remained high, ail thé more since a new case of cancer got declared,
concerning a child who had not visited thé school Franklin Roosevelt but had lived near thé former
industrial site. Ail thé cases of cancer were geographically situated on thé periphery of thé former
industrial site. Strong demands for complementary epidemiological and environmental investigations were
expressed by a local collective.
From June until August 2001, thé State Institute INERIS performed some complementary environmental
investigations of surface and sub-surface soils and of thé indoor air in thé Franklin Roosevelt school and
in three other schools in thé neighborhood, detecting no sign of contamination from thé underground.
From mid 2001 until end of 2003, a Participation Committee, directed by thé Prefect and later thé Sub-
Prefect, gathered représentatives and experts from thé industrial firm which operated on thé site, from thé
army health service, from local collectives, from local authorities (town, "département",...), and from thé
local and national administration (Health, Environment, Education). The Participation Committee
discussed thé issues, and thé Prefect took thé décisions1 and transmitted them to thé industrial firm. As a
former operator of a Classified Installation, thé industrial firm took in charge thé environmental studies on
and around its former site2.
The Participation Committee was technically supported by an independent Scientific Committee set up by
thé Health Ministry. The Scientific Committee gathered experts from mainly public organisms. No spécifie
budget was made available for its works, except for thé epidemiological studies. It was divided in two
subgroups, respectively for epidemiological and environmental studies. The Scientific Committee was
presided by an expert of thé State Institute InVS, thé environmental subgroup was coordinated by an
expert of thé INERIS. Those two experts are thé authors of thé présent article.
3.2. Epidemiological studies
The Scientific Committee designed two epidemiological studies, concerning two populations:
• thé children who had visited thé school Franklin Roosevelt;
• thé children living in thé surrounding town area.
Thèse were conducted by Inserm (National Institute for Médical Research) and InVS.
In 2004, thé provisory results of thé epidemiological studies (INSERM, 2004) did not confirm, statistically,
an excess of cancer in thé two populations considered: thé local aggregation of infant cancers may hâve
occurred purely by chance. The epidemiological studies were planned to go on for a longer period of time.
1
 or recommendations to thé army health service, which is not under thé authority of thé Prefect.
2
 The Industrial Firm had achieved a site remediation in 1986-1989, but this did not suppress its responsibility on a
residual pollution. In 2001-2003, it actually accepted to take in charge more than legally required, e.g. thé
measurement of exposure levels at places and for analyticalparameters not related to its former activities on thé site.
3.3. Environmental studies
For thé environmental studies, thé Scientific Committee issued proposais for thé scopes of works and
further recommendations, received ail protocols and reports (more than 30) and issued its opinion3 (more
than 20) and further recommendations. This work was done after concerting with thé différent
stakeholders, especially thé local collective, thé industrial firm, and thé local health and environment
authorities.
The environmental studies proposed by thé Scientific Committee (2001) had two objectives:
• To estimate risk différences between thé town area and a usual situation taken as a référence;
• To try to attribute those différences to spécifie pollutant sources.
For that, thé environmental studies combined two approaches:
• Comparative studv of thé concentrations in exposure média (soil, air, water,...), following a random
sélection of exposure points within in thé town area and référence areas in similar conditions in thé
neighborhood;
• Source-to-receptor approach, starting from thé documentary studies of thé former industrial site and of
thé Bégin hospital: history, hydrogeology...
Beside this set of coordinated studies, thé Scientific Committee accompanied exploratory investigations in
cellars and gardens and in thé groundwater which had been demanded by thé local collective and thé
Ministry of thé Environment.
Following thé demands of thé Scientific Committee, an environmental consultant firm was appointed by
thé industrial firm to review thé work of thé other contracting party in charge of thé studies around thé
former industrial site (hereafter "environmental contractant"). Its review finally did not correspond to thé
needs of thé Scientific Committee (CS, 2003a).
In 2003, thé results of thé environmental studies (CS, 2003a) showed a concentrated but apparently
punctual pollution of thé groundwater (10 m deep) and sometimes of thé soil and thé soil air, inclusive by
vinyl chloride and trichloroethen, two volatile and cancerogenous substances. Nevertheless, no excess of
exposure in thé town area linked to thé former industrial site was found. This indication was not définitive,
given thé fact that thé investigation of thé exposure média was punctual in time and space, and given
some metrological questions concerning thé soil air measures. Outside thé areas potentially concerned by
thé underground pollution, such an indication seemed sufficient. Within those areas, a more exhaustive
control and monitoring of possible transfer pathways had to be implemented, in order to confirm that no
transfer susceptible of causing a significant excess exposure would occur.
The control and monitoring program for thé former industrial site was decided by thé Sub-Prefect at thé
beginning of 2004, after concerting with thé stakeholders {e.g. CS, 2003b). The participation structure
deflated progressively back to thé current usual system: thé technical service of thé Prefect in charge of
thé industrial sites would control thé studies and prépare thé prescriptions; it would receive thé comments
of thé local collective, to which thé reports of thé control and monitoring were still addressed.
The control and monitoring campaigns realized so far hâve not shown significant transfer towards thé
receptors.
Besides, thé environmental exploratory studies conducted in 2002 in thé investigated town area and in a
nearby référence area showed a significant pollution of thé superficial soil in some places with lead and
(to a lesser extent) zinc, baryum, copper. Those results can not be related to thé former industrial site.
Thé local health administration handled thé question according to existing procédures for lead
contamination.
The impact assessment study for thé Bégin hospital, conducted in 2003, got rejected by thé Scientific
Committee due to its insufficient quality in regard to thé state of thé art (CS, 2003 c).
3
 which implied a deep work of critical analysis of thé received documents. Given thé lack of means (time and
financing), thé opinions did not hâve thé status of exhaustive third expertises.
4. Discussion of the stakeholders' involvement
4.1. Each party its part
In thé usual studies of contaminated sites in France, thé industrial firm can choose alone its environmental
contractant in charge of thé studies. But a third expert must be chosen in mutual agreement between thé
industrial firm and thé local authorities. The environmental contractant and its reviewer were appointed by
thé industrial firm without concerting with thé stakeholders or thé Scientific Committee. This may hâve
resulted from thé moral and judiciary urgency to start (and then complète) thé studies. During thé whole
process, thé local collective expressed some suspicion that thé environmental contractant and its reviewer
would not be impartial, even if thé environmental contractante investigation proposais and studies got
reviewed by thé Scientific Committee.
The Scientific Committee thoroughly maintained its visibility as "independent": a balanced relationship with
thé main two opposite parties, thé local collective and thé industrial firm, was cultivated: as much as
relevant, a meeting with one side was followed by a meeting with thé other side. The world of thé experts
in contaminated sites is small. Experts over différent parties were former colleagues. Significantly, thé
French casual form of "you", usual between two such acquaintances, was not used in thé meetings. For
thé expertise of thé environmental studies, thé appointment and thé financing of one expert of thé
Scientific Committee by thé industrial firm were excluded, even if thé décision were taken in thé
Participation Committee. Only a public hand would hâve been considered as possible (even if thé money
could corne from thé industrial firm).
An expert of thé local collective was first incorporated in thé Scientific Committee. He resigned after one
year.
This général attention to avoid any confusion of rôles implies that thé différent points of view are
maintained, and that a consensus should not be expected: in Vincennes, thé control and monitoring
program which ended thé environmental studies got very much discussed from September 2003 until
February or March 2004, when thé prescriptions of thé local authorities were issued. No consensus was
reached on one général conceptual point (was thé net of monitoring points from thé environmental studies
sufficient or should it be extended?) and on many détails (positioning of some points). But given thé
preceding discussion, this fact, and thé corollary that thé prescription would not be fully satisfactory for
oneself, was somehow accepted by thé participants. Hubert (2004) drew a similar conclusion after thé
expérience of thé Working Group "Nord-Cotentin" on thé impacts of thé nuclear site of La Hague in
France. More essential than thé consensus is thé feeling that thé différent points of view are honestly
taken into account. Which should not at ail be confused with an empty communication or a "social
treatment" of thé crisis, and manipulation: taking into account thé views of thé différent stakeholders had
very concrète conséquences on each part of thé studies eventually performed.
AN thé proposais and recommendations of thé Scientific Committee got accepted by thé Participation
Committee -or sometimes integrated in anticipation by thé industrial firm in it proposais-, and then
implemented. The Scientific Committee acquired thus a major rôle in thé préparation of thé décisions. But
it voluntarily strictly limited its rôle to thé technical aspects, as opposed to management: for instance, it
refused to answer thé question whether thé school Franklin Roosevelt should be closed or not, which was
a management question, but produced thé technical part of an answer (CS, 2003a). This technical part
eventually proved not determining in thé final décision (see § 4.3.4).
4.2. Experts and experts
A particularity of thé Scientific Committee was to gather experts of very différent fields. Within thé
subgroup for environmental studies, a shift could be observed. It led to passionate technical debating at
thé beginning of thé works of thé Scientific Committee. As usually on technical questions (not to confuse
with décision making: see § 4.1), an expert consensus could be reached.
The original debate is still visible in thé two approaches ("exposure measurement" vs. "source-to-
receptor") which could eventually be combined in thé final recommendations of thé Scientific Committee.
On that occasion, some experts on each side leamed something about thé relativity of their own
supposedly established approach and on multicultural work among experts.
4.3. Experts and non experts: establishing and maintaining thé relationship
An especially highly confident relationship was established between thé future INERIS expert in thé
Scientific Committee and thé local collective at thé favor of thé complementary environmental
investigations of June 2001 in thé school Franklin Roosevelt. The INERIS expert made thé documentary
study and thé soil and soil air sampling himself. A thirty-minutes présentation-discussion of thé study, thé
sampling program and thé sampling tools, with explanation of thé difficulties and limits of thé method, and
with some tool-handling by thé persons, was organized on-site prior to thé investigation between thé
INERIS expert and thé local collective. The local collective watched thé sampling, and some discussion
took place again between thé samplings.
This first contact determined thé whole further relationship between thé INERIS expert and thé local
collective. The same type of relationship could be established by other members of thé Scientific
Committee, and with other stakeholders. The ingrédients to an efficient stakeholders1 involvement as
appear in thé first contact described above are further illustrated and discussed hère under. Thèse
ingrédients amount to thé respect to thé other party: thé other party must be considered as a legitimate
partner with legitimate préoccupations and thé capacity to understand thé case. A key should be to
imagine oneself at thé place of thé other.
4.3.1. Personal engagement
The dialog with thé other stakeholders is not delegated, and a strong personal availability is achieved to
allow an almost permanent direct contact: a discussion between thé local collective or thé industrial firm
for instance and thé président or thé two coordinators of thé Scientific Committee was always possible on
a very short term. In thé whole, thé experts of thé Scientific Committee spent together several hundred
working days on thé case, much on their personal time. Holidays were interrupted for one meeting, week-
ends were spent on thé case. The similar financial and personal engagement of thé industrial firm and its
environmental contractant got acknowledgment by ail parties thé local collective included, and this
certainly help smoothen their relationship in thé curse of time. For example, thé communication director
and thé environmental manager of thé industrial firm, thé Prefect, participated themselves to thé meetings.
4.3.2. Honestv on thé limits of thé work
The scientific Committee in its documents and more directly its members in thé personal did not fear to
expose thé limits and uncertainties in their proposais, for example concerning thé classification of some
cancers in thé epidemiological study, thé ability to model vapor transfer (natural dégradation included) in
thé soil air and through thé concrète floor (SC, 2003a), or thé proportionality of some measurements
proposed (Hazebrouck et al., 2003).
On thé contrary, thé main reproach of thé local collective towards thé environmental contractant, which in
its view confirmed its original suspicion and prevented a full collaboration between thé two, besides some
local punctual asymmetries in thé détail of some data présentation, concerned thé non disclosure of thé
remaining unknown and thé resulting doubts4.
The expert must be able to say: "I do not know". Defining thé limits of thé knowledge, and thus of thé rôle
of technique and experts vs. management, should precisely be thé main rôle of thé expert: outside those
limits, thé experts are not more legitimate than non experts to make décisions (Testait, 2000).
The way this honesty is translated should nevertheless carefully be chosen taking account of thé
audience, so as not to end up with more anxiety (see § 4.3.4).
4.3.3. Breaking thé distance between non experts and thé field of expertise: demvstifying thé expertise
It should first be reminded that site investigation and risk assessment, and thé associated uncertainties,
are no far-fetched concepts: they are primarily based on common sensé, and can be encountered in
everyday's life. Therefore a demystified communication should allow a good général compréhension
between experts and non experts.
4
 In fact, many uncertainties were discussed and taken into account in thé study. But thé Scientific Committee often
had to signal other major uncertainties and limits of thé study which would induce a need for further investigations.
Given thé generally poor discussion and intégration of thé uncertainties in site assessments in France, this should not
suggest any dishonesty from thé environmental contractant: its environmental study was much over thé average on
that point.
As a first step, thé access to thé case should be made as concrète as possible, through attendance at
investigations, site visits, graphs, pictures,.... For example, an extensive work of mapping and map
superposition by thé environmental contractant in thé historical study and in thé proposais for thé
investigations, certainly allowed much of thé understanding of thé approach and of thé site itself. Such an
approach is recognized to break thé distance between thé field of thé expertise and thé non experts.
As a second step, thé INERIS expert, in long discussions with his correspondent of thé local collective,
and in a lesser extent in thé Participation Committee meetings, always displayed as extensively as
relevant supposedly complicated thèmes such as:
• limits, uncertainties, lack of validation, of thé metrological and modeling tools used in thé study in
particular and in contaminated site assessment in général,
• then thé impossibility to get rid of ail uncertainties, and finally thé subséquent concept of
proportionality which is so difficult to accept at first in its concrète applications.
The compréhension by thé non-experts seemed good. More detailed technical discussion of thé concepts
of thé Johnson and Ettinger model for vapor transfer from soil air into indoor air, or of thé use of active
carbon for thé measure of a multiple pollution in soil air, did not seem out of reach at ail for thé person of
thé local collective. After three years, having consulted several sources of technical information on thé
models, that person had become an expert on vapor measurement and transfer. A Key ingrédient for a
good understanding seemed to be time and good will: on thé contrary, one actor, apparently not so
motivated by thé technical accuracy of thé décisions, would not understand a more simple issue: thé
différence between thé absence of détection of vapor transfer on a few points, and a comprehensive
control of vapor transfer through a net of sampling points selected based on thé site history, thé current
(partial) knowledge on thé pollution sources, and thé configuration of thé buildings. Bonano et al. (2000),
in an experiment of virtual stakeholders' involvement with a test group, came to thé same conclusion,
identifying time and motivation as major ingrédients for an efficient stakeholders1 involvement. The case of
Vincennes brings a confirmation on a real case.
4.3.4. Proactive, non-stressful communication
In thé way they formulate their results and conclusion, or in their silence itself, given thé expectation of thé
population and their status, experts and managers of thé expertise hâve a dramatic influence on thé
anxiety of thé population.
In Vincennes, thé formai structure of thé Participation Committee did not allow a proactive information
especially towards thé média: contacts to thé média were limited to a few persons and occasions, thé
messages were previously extensively reviewed. Each public communication to thé général population
also got through an extensive review by différent stakeholders and/or thé Scientific Committee. Yet
supplementary information was available for thé public, in an indirect way5, through thé local collective and
its direct contacts with thé Participation and Scientific Committees.
The school Franklin Roosevelt got closed, based not on thé conclusions of thé site investigations, but on
thé need to protect thé children and their families from thé média: TV caméras and journalists were at thé
school's door, worst-case rumors were circulating.... The level of psychological stress upon thé children,
and its anxiogenous impact, became obvious through thé following story: a child fell on its nose in thé
school yard, bled a little, and immediately asked: "Am I going to die?". This story largely contributed
convincing thé Participation Committee of thé need to close thé school.
Other real-case expérience (Colas, 2004; Hazebrouck et al., 2005) shows that proactive information
towards thé média and thé population can strongly help to avoid an excessive psychological impact: thé
absence of information lets rumors and even phantasms spread out. Making thé information available (if
necessary taking time to explain thé situation to a joumalist) will fill this void.
Concerning thé formulation of thé results, discussions with thé epidemiologists on first drafts from thé
environmental subgroup of thé Scientific Committee showed that thé same results can be formulated in a
stressful way (and will often be so in a first version) or a non stressful way. Review by a non expert person
remains a good way to heave this risk. The population should not be left by thé experts with a problem
without solutions: at least outlines of a realistic solution, and preferably also a timetable, should be
produced. Thus, as thé lead contamination of some superficial soils was discovered, a response was
immediately implemented by thé local health administration.
5
 with thé possible bias. In 2003, a second local collective appeared, with views opposite to those of thé first local
collective.
In Vincennes, thé population was well educated, which may hâve make thé communication, and specially
thé open communication towards thé local collective, easier. A non stressfull communication on thé
uncertainties could be much more difficult in less educated populations.
Other aspects of thé context must also be taken into account: thé first public meeting in Vincennes turned
violent and had to be interrupted and thé room had to be evacuated. Another one a little later, organized
by thé local collective, could go to thé end. For thé meeting, was thé population not ready suspicious that
thé authorities would bury thé affair, were thé solutions presented at that time not précise and concrète
enough? Was thé médiation of thé local collective necessary? A général explanation would be that thé
dialog came a little too late: ail phantasms and rumors had been breading for too long. Other real-case
expérience (Colas, 2004; Hazebrouck et al., 2005) shows that an anticipated dialog makes things much
easier.
5. Conclusion
Thé présentation of thé real case of Vincennes and its discussion in thé light of other expériences
underline that an efficient stakeholders' participation is possible, provided there is personal engagement
(including time) and good will on ail sides. The following positive ingrédients were identified:
• clear répartition of thé rôles, with no fusion nor obligatory final consensus;
• respect for thé other party and its préoccupations;
• personal engagement (time, no délégation);
• honesty on thé limits of thé work and hence of thé field of experts;
• concrète access to thé case (attendance at investigations, site visits, graphs, pictures,....
• Proactive, non-stressful communication, including towards thé média, which implies not to let
problems "open" and to anticipate thé wish for dialog.
The participation process may help remind experts that décisions are not based on technical criteria only,
and do not hâve to: given thé many limits in site assessment, thé technique does not answer to ail
questions, and an adéquate décision process intégrâtes thé opinions and wishes of stakeholders such as
thé population.
A large and formai Participation Committee with a Scientific Committee like in Vincennes would certainly
not be recommended for ail types of stakeholders1 participation. In Vincennes, it responded to a state of
crisis, to thé gravity of thé effect (observed lethal cancers on children) and to thé ignorance of a clear
source. In its final évaluation, thé Scientific Committee itself recommended to limit thé use of Scientific
Committees to situations that can not be solved by thé existing ways. For other situations, such an
organization would generally prove counter-productive, due to lack of directness, spontaneity and
reactivity. A direct organization of stakeholders1 participation by thé entity in charge of thé site, under thé
control of local authorities and/or a third-expert (selected in a mutual agreement), should be in most cases
sufficient and more efficient.
Even if directness and spontaneity are wished, organizational and operational tools for thé stakeholders1
participation would be useful. Such tools are not available in Europe6, as well as thé knowledge on risk
perception for contaminated sites necessary for thé development of such tools. The French Institutes on
risks INERIS (industrial risk) and IRSN (nuclear risk) are currently working on thé development of support
documents and guidelines for stakeholders1 participation in thé management of health impacts of
contaminated sites. This R&D project is financed by thé ADEME (Agence de l'Environnement et de la
Maîtrise de l'Energie). A steering committee gathers thé points of view of thé local sanitary administration
(including thé InVS), of thé Ministry of thé Environment, of industrial firms and of environmental
consultants.
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